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While the TGS duo is justly known for its foundational work on the
application of Rule 10b-5 to insider trading and corporate misstatements,
two other aspects of the two cases are the focus of this contribution. The
first is the development of the role of the SEC as conservator, derived origi-
nally from the equity side of federal bankruptcy law, but expanded to func-
tion as a general equitable remedy. That remedy faced difficult issues
concerning the ranking of different victims of insider trading, in particular
the status of an entity as a claimant in competition with victimized market
participants. The second, often overlooked, is the two cases’ pioneering
role in the management of individual and in particular of class actions laid
in a number of different jurisdictions, which is an issue that, for the first
time, called into play the then-new Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation.
The first aspect leads in a fairly straight line to the Fair Funds compo-
nent of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (as amended by the Dodd-Frank
Act of 2010), and to the doctrinal development of that component in prac-
tice. The second aspect, however, was impacted over the following three
decades by the growing judicial and statutory hostility to broadening the
role of the private class action generally, and of its Rule 10b-5 segment
specifically. Therefore, this article also contributes to the newer discourse
about the respective roles of private versus public litigation in the field of
securities regulation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
HOW often is a case hailed as a legal landmark before it is evendecided? In 1965, a year before the district court decision in SECv. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,1 let alone before the 1968 appellate
decision we celebrate in this symposium,2 major analyses of the SEC’s
complaint, written by prominent practitioners in the field of securities
regulation, were published in leading journals.3 Once the flurry of deci-
sions was over, a further slew of articles began to appear, and the case
immediately became a staple of corporation law casebooks.4
The complaint indeed represented a major step forward in the develop-
ment of public enforcement of the broadly phrased § 10b of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), and—following in the train of
the decisions—of private litigation under its equally protean Rule 10b-5.
It needs to be recalled that it was only in 1961 that the first SEC proceed-
1. See generally SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
2. In fact, two major opinions were decided—the second more relevant to the follow-
ing discussion. The first opinion is the one usually considered, as it contains the substantive
discussion of both insider trading liability and corporate liability for misleading public
statements. See generally SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) [hereinafter TGS I]. The second, principally discussing reme-
dies, is the starting point for the following discussion. See generally SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971) [hereinafter
TGS II].
3. See, e.g., Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Securities Trading and Corporate Information Prac-
tices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271 (1965);
W. McNeil Kennedy & Herbert S. Wander, Texas Gulf Sulphur, A Most Unusual Case, 20
BUS. LAW. 1057 (1965); William H. Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the De-
velopment of Federal Corporation Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1361 (1965).
Insightful on the complaint’s provenance is the Symposium, Insider Trading in Stocks, 21
BUS. LAW. 1009 (1966), which will be discussed in a bit more detail below.
4. Thanks to the vagaries of publication schedules, NORMAN D. LATTIN, RICHARD
W. JENNINGS & RICHARD M. BUXBAUM, CORPORATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 732 (4th
ed. 1968) was the first to contain the original district court opinion. The first casebook to
publish the principal appellate opinion we celebrate here was that of WILLIAM L. CARY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 726 (4th ed. 1969).
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ing based on insider trading—In re Cady Roberts & Co.5—had been de-
cided.6 Before TGS (but more or less contemporaneously with Cady
Roberts) the only context in which this type of behavior had been sanc-
tioned was in bankruptcy, where it was recognized as a ground for denial
of compensation for services.7 It therefore is no surprise that the decision
was understood by contemporaneous observers as an important—and to
many a necessary—breakthrough, especially since the common (state)
law continued to reject liability for trading on the basis of non-disclosure
of material information to “the market,” as distinct from face-to-face
trading.8
The importance of the Cady, Roberts move to the decision of the SEC
to extend it beyond the financial services sector—i.e., to the TGS com-
plaint—was perfectly obvious to the actors at the time. At the earlier-
mentioned symposium on TGS, William Cary, the just-retired SEC Chair-
man, quipped that “I have been accused on occasion of having sired
Texas Gulf out of Cady Roberts.”9 Considering the novelty of seeking
judicial condemnation of insider trading not on the basis of directly mis-
leading the market, it is indeed fair to see TGS as both a clear and an
intentional expansion of the role of public enforcement of the trans-
parency of the stock markets. Finally, the SEC itself more or less officially
has recognized the two cases as the origin of the modern era.10
And with that introduction, it is time to turn to the case itself.
5. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
6. Of course, actions against brokers and dealers for actively misleading or conceal-
ing material information from clients while trading with them, usually leading to cancelling
their registration, had been based inter alia on Rule 10b-5 almost from its 1942 promulga-
tion. A typical example is Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944), and its sequel, 174 F.2d 969, 976–77 (2d Cir. 1949). But while
Cady Roberts, too, involved only cancellation of the tipper’s broker-dealer registration, it
was the first case involving non-disclosure in the anonymous context of a stock exchange as
compared with the direct trading with customers that was the hallmark of these earlier
cases. 40 S.E.C. at 907.
7. See Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 653–54 (1963). In addition, shortly before
TGS arrived on the scene, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of the SEC to compel a
registered investment adviser to disclose to clients its practice of “scalping”—purchasing
securities for its own account, recommending their purchase to its clients, and then selling
the securities once the market price rose (even if the rise was not causally traceable to
either the firm’s or the clients’ purchases). See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 196–97 (1963). The charge was violation of § 17 of the Investment Ad-
visers Act of 1940, which reads essentially as does § 10b. Id. at 189.
8. The classic case being Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (Mass. 1933). The
hoary variant known as the “special facts doctrine” after Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419,
431 (1909), while useful in the face-to-face situation, continues to this day to falter at the
door of the impersonal-market one. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch
Mob: The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087,
1103–04 (1996).
9. Symposium, supra note 3, at 1009.
10. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT
NO. 531, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN THE DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT’S OVERSIGHT OF
FUND ADMINISTRATORS 2 (2015).
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II. THE CHARGES IN TEXAS GULF SULPHUR11
TGS I is a foundational case in two senses. It represented not only a
forward step in the just-described sense, but also decided a broad range
of issues necessarily arising from that breakthrough. The headnotes
placed on its coverage by the major databases alone make that point.
Within its pioneering analysis of the basic issues of fraud and manipula-
tion (as both the statute and Rule use the phrase), it formulated the “dis-
close or abstain” principle and fully discussed mode, time, and manner of
appropriate disclosure. It described the types of “non-public market in-
formation” to be disclosed in the context of its parallel concern with the
public-market participants as the addressees for whom disclosure would
matter.12 Perhaps most memorably in that connection, it developed the
“magnitude discounted by probability” formulation of the materiality re-
quirement of the legislative text. This is a concept underlying most of the
subsequent jurisprudence, and though later refined for the purpose of its
role in the “proxy fraud” Rule 14a-9 context, it is essentially compatible
with that reformulation.13
The opinion tackled and articulated the application of the classic equa-
tion of recklessness with intent, and brought this centuries-old common
law doctrine into the world of capital markets. It developed the embry-
onic Cady, Roberts formulation of the tipper and tippee into a full-blown
doctrine, even if it is one that took decades of further refinement to lock
into place. It paved the way for consideration of the role of stock options
within the insider-trading framework, even to the point of their backdat-
ing, thus giving guidance to state courts treating that issue as a matter of
fiduciary duty more generally. As an aside, and a first acknowledgement
of the subject of this presentation, it used the stock-option context to be-
gin its consideration of remedies—both in the already established sense
11. See generally TGS I, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
12. See id. (anticipating Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)).
13. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976), reformulated the stan-
dard of materiality differently—”[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likeli-
hood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote”.
Basic, 485 U.S. at 231, purports to find in this “a standard of materiality under [all] the
securities laws” (emphasis added) across the board. However, I submit that to the degree
TSC differs from the TGS I formulation, it does so in the same sense TSC Industries’ obiter
dicta did when suggesting that a lower standard than recklessness might suffice for a Rule
14a-9 violation; namely, in the safeguards specific to honoring the importance of an unsul-
lied shareholder vote. See TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 444. That, after all, was one of the
messages of Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381 (1970): “The decision below, by
permitting all liability to be foreclosed on the basis of a finding that the merger was fair,
would allow the stockholders to be bypassed. . . . A judicial appraisal of the merger’s merits
could be substituted for the actual and informed vote of the stockholders.” See also Gould
v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 770 (3d Cir. 1976), which speaks directly to
the question of whether negligence would suffice for a violation of Rule 14a-9, a dictum
generally followed in later cases. Id. at 777. “Materiality” in the § 10b sense is even less
relevant in the Rule 14a-9 context of the election of directors, and their record of past
behavior is at issue in terms of its disclosure. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789
(2d Cir. 1979). But see, e.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981).
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of the permanent injunction, and in the still only nascent sense of restitu-
tion and rescission.
Finally, the opinion takes on the two important institutional issues: the
duties and liabilities of the corporation in the field of public statements,
and the functions and powers of the SEC (e.g., its authority to require
correction of prior statements and even of rumors affecting public mar-
kets even if not emanating from the entity itself).
In short, TGS I and II qualify as one of a rare set of opinions that
need—let alone deserve—this half-century retrospective. They remain
foundational to this day.
III. THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSERVATORSHIP AS A
REMEDIAL DEVICE
The path first leads not forward, but back: to the recognition that label-
ing the federal courts as courts of equity (as well as of law) had conse-
quences. For present purposes it suffices to take the story back to judicial
engagement with issues of bankruptcy and reorganization—specifically to
Justice Douglas and his sweeping pronunciamento in Pepper v. Litton:
Courts of bankruptcy . . . are invested ‘with such jurisdiction at law
and in equity as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction in
bankruptcy proceedings.’ Consequently this Court has held that for
many purposes ‘courts of bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity,
and their proceedings inherently proceedings in equity’. . . . [A]
bankruptcy court is a court of equity at least in the sense that in the
exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the act, it applies the
principles and rules of equity jurisprudence.14
From that acorn has grown an entire jurisprudence, extending into neigh-
boring fields such as the one at issue here—the field of securities regula-
tion. As the following excerpt from Pepper v. Litton suggests, this
extension in a sense was foreshadowed from the start:
That equitable power also exists in passing on claims presented by an
officer, director, or stockholder in the bankruptcy proceedings of his
corporation. . . . A director is a fiduciary. So is a dominant or control-
ling stockholder or group of stockholders. Their powers are powers
in trust. Their dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigorous
scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the
corporation is challenged the burden is on the director or stock-
holder not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to
show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and
those interested therein. The essence of the test is whether or not
under all the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of
an arm’s length bargain. If it does not, equity will set it aside. While
14. See 308 U.S. 295, 303–04 (1939). To the same effect, at the same time and by the
same Justice, see Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 114–15 (1939). The
first case applying these bedrock principles in the securities field was a near contemporary:
Deckert v. Indep. Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 288 (1940) (Murphy, J.), a 1933 Securities
Act case.
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normally that fiduciary obligation is enforceable directly by the cor-
poration, or through a stockholder’s derivative action, it is, in the
event of bankruptcy of the corporation, enforceable by the trustee.
For that standard of fiduciary obligation is designed for the protec-
tion of the entire community of interests in the corporation-creditors
as well as stockholders.15
While the issue in the case of insider trading (and of corporate mis-
statements or omissions of material information) rests on the question of
disclosure—of transparency—and not on abusive exercise of an insider’s
power of decision-making within the corporation, the fact that courts
have had to struggle with this distinction suggests the institutional affinity
of the two contexts of bankruptcy and of securities regulation, and thus
the ease of bringing the equity features of bankruptcy administration to
the latter field.
Even within the field of securities regulation, TGS II also had prede-
cessors, though none with the precedential value of the case itself. Fur-
thermore, its predecessors’ principal use of equitable remedies was in the
realm of injunctions to prohibit individuals and legal persons from future
violations of relevant regulations, principally violations of the prohibition
on insider trading.16 This is not surprising, since until Cady, Roberts the
recovery of profits was not the aim or hallmark of regulatory actions
launched by the SEC. It was clear at the time, therefore, that TGS II was
sailing into uncharted waters, and the opinion spends considerable time
establishing the precedents the court claimed in justification of its
holding:
Appellants contend that, although the district court is given general
equity powers under § 27 of the Act, the SEC does not have author-
ity under the Act to seek anything but injunctive relief under § 21(e),
together with whatever ancillary relief is necessary to enforce an in-
junction, such as the appointment of a receiver. . . . However, despite
some legislative history purportedly to the contrary, we do not read
§ 21(e) as restricting the remedies which the SEC can pursue to in-
junctive relief.17
The court begins by tracing the history of receivership as “ancillary re-
lief” in cases arising out of fraudulent or similar behavior of the affected
entity’s principals under a variety of market-regulatory statutes.18 Ap-
pointment of a receiver as an ancillary remedy was a common feature in
15. Pepper, 308 U.S. at 306–07.
16. See generally George W. Dent, Jr., Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law: A
Study in Federal Remedies, 67 MINNESOTA L. REV. 865 (1983). The authority of the SEC to
order, and obtain judicial confirmation of, exclusion of financial-sector participants from
their profession was and remains based on explicit statutory provisions and is not a part of
this narrative.
17. TGS II, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). The princi-
pal criticism of its reliance on the general equitable powers of the federal courts was levied
shortly thereafter. See James R. Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement
Suits, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1779, 1800 (1976).
18. TGS II, 446 F.2d at 1307–08.
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the “near-insolvency” subset of these situations; apparently it was intro-
duced to the investor-protection field through cases involving the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940.19 These, however, typically involved entities
for which bankruptcy proceedings would have been a valid, and indeed,
required alternative had they been instituted.20 In other words, the anal-
ogy was a forced one, considering that Texas Gulf Sulphur was hardly in
financial straits.
Not resting on this questionable precedent, TGS II reached further,
stating: “Moreover, in other contexts the Supreme Court has upheld the
power of the Government without specific statutory authority to seek res-
titution, and has upheld the lower courts in granting restitution, as an
ancillary remedy in the exercise of the courts’ general equity powers to
afford complete relief.”21
While the cases cited for this proposition concern unfair labor practices
and price-ceiling violations, one of them indeed is a sufficient source for
its application. The price-control statute at issue in Porter v. Warner
Holding Co. specified that in the event of a violation, “a permanent or
temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order shall be
granted . . . .”22 Over a dissent based on the exclusio alterius canon of
construction, the Court confirmed the bedrock principle:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, all the inherent equitable pow-
ers of the District Court are available for the proper and complete
exercise of that jurisdiction. And since the public interest is involved
in a proceeding of this nature, those equitable powers assume an
even broader and more flexible character than when only a private
controversy is at stake.23
Given this background, the Court’s reliance on § 27 of the 1934 Ex-
19. See SEC v. Fiscal Fund, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 712, 714 (D. Del. 1943).
20. For a good treatment of this situation, including reference to the subject-matter
jurisdictional limitations of the federal court, see Esbitt v. Dutch-American Mercantile
Corp., 335 F.2d 141, 142 (2d Cir. 1964):
All the parties are residents of New York, and since there is no diversity, the
District Court had jurisdiction to entertain the receiver’s suit only if it was
ancillary to the SEC action. The defendant contends that a suit to collect a
simple debt cannot be properly termed ‘ancillary’ to the SEC action. We can-
not agree. If the receiver’s suit is to aid in the accomplishment of the ends
sought and directed in the SEC action, it is ancillary to the main action for
jurisdictional purposes. . . . [I]t seems reasonably clear . . . that one of the
aims of the SEC suit was to protect investors who had already been de-
frauded by the practices of the First Discount Corporation. If the assets of
the First Discount Corporation are not promptly marshalled to provide a
fund from which defrauded investors may be at least partially reimbursed,
there is a strong possibility that these assets will be dissipated or wasted. A
primary purpose of appointing a receiver is to conserve the existing estate.
21. TGS II, 446 F.2d at 1307.
22. 328 U.S. 395, 397 (1946).
23. Id. at 398. The dissent contended that the specifics of the statutory scheme indeed
did exclude the restitution of illegal overcharges by necessary inference. Id. at 404 (Rut-
ledge, J., dissenting).
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change Act was fully supportable.24 While the citation to its use in the
Mills case25 is not entirely apposite (there, it justified the grant of attor-
ney’s fees in a proxy-violation situation),26 extending that section’s reach
to restitution of the insider-traders’ profits was a small step:
There is little doubt that § 27 of the Act confers general equity
power upon the district courts . . . . While Mills was dealing with
relief to private litigants, we deem the above statement to be fully
applicable in enforcement actions by the SEC. Thus we hold that the
SEC may seek other than injunctive relief in order to effectuate the
purposes of the Act, so long as such relief is remedial relief and is not
a penalty assessment.27
As to the argument that the required restitution was a penalty assess-
ment, TGS II took a position essentially uncontested at the time, though
one in another context questionable now:
This contention overlooks the realities of the situation. In our prior
opinion we found that these appellants had violated the Act by their
purchases of TGS stock before there had been a public disclosure of
the ore discovery. Restitution of the profits on these transactions
merely deprives the appellants of the gains of their wrongful con-
duct. Nor does restitution impose a hardship in this case. . . . The
court’s order requires only restitution of the profits made by the vio-
lators prior to general knowledge of the ore strike on April 17, 1964,
and, in effect, leaves the appellants all the profits accrued after that
date. It would severely defeat the purposes of the Act if a violator of
Rule 10b-5 were allowed to retain the profits from his violation.28
Nonetheless, TGS II did introduce a new element into this jurispruden-
tial sequence, one bearing directly on the move to the Sarbanes–Oxley
(SOX) Fair-Funds regime; namely, the need for the administration of a
structured distribution scheme of the conservator’s fund to eligible par-
ticipants. While this of course is a standard feature of the receivership
analogy already discussed, not to mention of the bankruptcy or reorgani-
zation alternative, it was a new feature in this conservatorship context
and needed fleshing out. That discussion follows, after one preliminary
digression.
The use of the implied-tort principle to generate a private cause of ac-
tion from a regulatory statute, obviously both an assumption and a cause
of the inevitable complications TGS II would generate, need not be re-
hearsed here. Suffice it to point out that this principle was first applied to
§ 10b and Rule 10b-5 in what rightly is considered the seminal case of
24. Compare the roughly contemporaneous critique of the entire equitable-remedies
scheme in Farrand, supra note 17, at 1780–84.
25. See generally Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
26. Id. at 388–89. “[W]e cannot fairly infer from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 a
purpose to circumscribe the courts’ power to grant appropriate remedies.” Id. at 391.
27. TGS II, 446 F.2d 1301, 1307–08 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
28. Id. at 1308. The qualification now needed concerns the nature of the civil penalty
for purposes of prescription and is discussed in Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1643–44
(2017).
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Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.29 It survived the Burger Court’s counter-
revolution, though not without distinctly different levels of embrace—re-
luctantly in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,30 and Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder,31 more enthusiastically in Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston.32
That principle indeed is the bedrock on which the balance of this pres-
entation is based; and at the same time the theme that ties together TGS
II and the SOX’s Fair Funds provisions. The first matter to be discussed
in that connection is the structure of that conservatorship itself; the sec-
ond, the complex interplay between that regime and the earlier- (or later)
filed private actions by essentially the same category of victimized inves-
tors, who by and large had standing to proceed against the insiders.
A. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TGS DISTRIBUTION SCHEME
AND DIRECT INDIVIDUAL OR CLASS ACTIONS BY ELIGIBLE
SHAREHOLDERS
As already mentioned, some private actions had been filed before even
the first TGS decision was issued, and more followed. The second deci-
sion recognized both the existence and possible ranking of private ac-
tions, albeit at first only in the context of the harm to, and possible
recovery by, Texas Gulf Sulphur itself on the Diamond v. Oreamuno33
rationale:
[A] corporate enterprise may well suffer harm ‘when officers and
directors abuse their position to obtain personal profits’ since ‘the
effect may be to cast a cloud on the corporation’s name, injure stock-
holder relations and undermine public regard for the corporation’s
securities.’ Although the sellers of TGS stock who sold before April
17, 1964, may have a higher equity than TGS to recover from appel-
lants the wrongful profits appellants obtained, this fact does not pre-
clude conditional compensation to TGS. Nor, as the appellants
appear to imply, is the district court precluded from applying a state
29. See 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Without explicit citation thereto, the
opinion clearly reflects the seminal argument of Ezra Ripley Thayer, Public Wrong and
Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317 (1914).
30. See 421 U.S. 723, 729–30 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.):
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act does not by its terms provide an express civil
remedy for its violation. Nor does the history of this provision provide any
indication that Congress considered the problem of private suits under it at
the time of its passage. . . . Similarly there is no indication that the Commis-
sion in adopting Rule 10b-5 considered the question of private civil remedies
under this provision.
31. See 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (Powell, J.) (expressing similar reluctance).
32. See 459 U.S. 375, 386–87 (1983) (Marshall, J.); see also Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S.
at 730 (internal citations omitted) (“This Court had no occasion to deal with the subject
until 25 years later, and at that time we confirmed with virtually no discussion the over-
whelming consensus of the District Courts and Courts of Appeals that such a cause of
action did exist. Such a conclusion was, of course, entirely consistent with the Court’s rec-
ognition in [J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)], that private enforcement of
Commission rules may ‘(provide) a necessary supplement to Commission action.’”).
33. See 248 N.E.2d 910, 914 (N.Y. 1969).
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concept of harm to the corporation.”34
This holding, however, did not address the more complex issues of the
right of direct actions once the conservatorship fund had been estab-
lished, and assuming that right of the ranking of what then would become
two sets of claims to that fund.
The first practical intimation of these issues, and of their appropriate
resolution, had in fact already appeared in the district court’s opinion
that, on appeal, led to TGS II:
The Coates settlement included the following provision: ‘. . . except
that if Coates or his estate shall incur liability to any person or entity
by reason of his purchases of Texas Gulf stock on April 16, 1964, . . .
as a result of a judgment in or settlement of any other action com-
menced prior to the date hereof, Texas Gulf will, at the request of
Coates or his estate, apply any or all of the remaining balance of said
amount toward the satisfaction of such liability.’35
Since Texas Gulf Sulphur itself was a defendant in these cases, its obliga-
tion to turn over “excess” funds to directly impacted former shareholders
(for these were the victims of the non-disclosure of material information
who, by selling into a distorted low-price market, had Blue Chip standing)
was close to self-evident, despite its own Diamond v. Oreamuno standing.
A separate preliminary issue concerns the legal characterization of the
claims against the insider-traders. It is best formulated in the admittedly
unusual situation present in Haines v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co.36 Plaintiffs (attorneys for a party subject to an SEC enforcement pro-
ceeding) sought judgment against their insurer on a professional liability
policy for the costs of their own defense against these proceedings. They
argued that the SEC was seeking either return of their fees ancillary to
the principal injunctive relief it sought, or to hold them as aiders and
abettors of their clients—a tort judgment. The court denied their effort to
bring the insurer to their defense under the policy in terms directly rele-
vant to the following discussion:
Plaintiffs’ argument fails to recognize the nature and purpose of the
ancillary relief available under Texas Gulf Sulphur. . . . Disgorge-
ment is available in a securities action only if one has made a profit.
It is not equivalent to a tort damage award because the monetary
award is measured not by the damage to plaintiff, but by the gain of
the defendant. Disgorgement is limited only to those who profit by
their by their wrongdoing and does not extend beyond that. . . . [I]f
plaintiffs neither participated in nor profited from the offering, the
remedy would be unavailable. . . . To find that plaintiffs could be
liable for the profits of others, the court would have to ignore [the]
34. TGS II, 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971) (em-
phasis added).
35. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 93 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (emphasis
added).
36. 428 F. Supp. 435 (D. Md. 1977).
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rationale underlying the disgorgement remedy.37
B. THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW AFTER TGS I AND II—PHASE ONE
The private action against both insider traders and corporations for
misleading statements or omissions developed in three successive stages
before reaching SOX. The first stage is best illustrated by the conflicting
outcomes in the two marquee cases, Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner and Smith, Inc.,38 and Fridrich v. Bradford,39 decided in 1973 and
1976, respectively. Both cases involved corporate insiders tipping off cli-
ents about a material financial development; the clients then engaged in
stock-market trading, selling in the first case and buying in the second,
without any public disclosure of the respective material events. Class ac-
tion status was not critical in Shapiro, but became critical in Fridrich.
Common to both, and the focus of this part of the discussion, was the
still-open question of the fourth of the “five fingers of fraud,” the element
of causation.40 In Shapiro, its relevance for anonymous-market trading
that occurs without the face-to-face relation that establishes privity be-
tween the parties was denied:
We consistently have held that causation is a necessary element of a
private action for damages under Rule 10b-5. Indeed, we have re-
fused ‘to facilitate outsiders’ proof of insiders’ fraud’ by ‘reading out
of (Rule 10b-5) so basic an element of tort law as the principle of
causation in fact.’ This is consistent with ‘the basic concept that cau-
sation must be proved else defendants could be held liable to all the
world.’ And we have recognized that the aim of Rule 10b-5 ‘is to
qualify, as between insiders and outsiders, the doctrine of caveat
emptor—not to establish a scheme of investors’ insurance.’
As one branch of their absence of causation argument, defendants
contend that there was no privity between themselves and plaintiffs.
We hold here, as we have held before, that privity between plaintiffs
and defendants is not a requisite element of a Rule 10b-5 cause of
37. Id. at 441–42. But the rise in value of property wrongfully purchased (face-to-face)
may be part of the disgorgement remedy. See Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965) (“If the property is not bought from, but sold to the
fraudulent party, future accretions not foreseeable at the time of the transfer even on the
true facts, and hence speculative, are subject to another factor, viz., that they accrued to
the fraudulent party. It may, as in the case at bar, be entirely speculative whether, had
plaintiffs not sold, the series of fortunate occurrences would have happened in the same
way, and to their same profit. However, there can be no speculation but that the defendant
actually made the profit and, once it is found that he acquired the property by fraud, that
the profit was the proximate consequence of the fraud, whether foreseeable or not. It is
more appropriate to give the defrauded party the benefit even of windfalls than to let the
fraudulent party keep them.”).
38. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
39. 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976). I borrow some of the following text from RICHARD
W. JENNINGS & RICHARD M. BUXBAUM, CORPORATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 605–11
(5th ed. 1979).
40. See Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 460–61 (2013)
(reciting these elements).
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action for damages. For example, we have upheld Rule 10b-5 claims
for relief where there have been no direct transactions between
plaintiffs and defendants. . . . ‘[P]erhaps the first step is to realize that
the common law requirement of privity has all but vanished from
10b-5 proceedings while the distinguishable ‘connection’ element is
retained.’ And we [have] recognized that ‘before there may be a vio-
lation of the securities acts there need not be present all of the same
elements essential to a common law fraud . . . .’ In short, causation as
an element of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action can be established not-
withstanding lack of privity.41
Since the plaintiffs’ request for class certification was not resolved, the
decision did not deal directly with the consequence of this ruling on the
quantum of damages. A brief dictum, however, signaled that this issue
needed prudential consideration: “[W]e do not foreclose the possibility
that an analysis by the district court of the nature and character of the
Rule 10b-5 violations committed may require limiting the extent of liabil-
ity imposed on either class of defendants.”42
That issue was central to Fridrich, and at least inferentially explains its
ruling concerning the causation requirement. Pursuant to a consent de-
cree between the SEC and defendant, Fridrichs’ tippee profits had been
disgorged and escrowed along with the illicit profits of other principal
defendants for eventual distribution to Blue Chip-eligible selling share-
holders. One class eligible for participation in the eventual distribution
instead sued for the difference between the false and later-corrected
price. It recovered a judgment amounting to thirty times Fridrichs’ profit.
In a subtle and understandable effort to avoid such an outcome, given the
disgorgement-of-profits framework, the court took the indirect route of
revisiting the issue of causation in the non-privity context:
The duty to disclose . . . is not an absolute one, but an alternative
one, that of either disclosing or abstaining from trading. We conceive
it to be the act of trading which essentially constitutes the violation
of Rule 10b-5, for it is this which brings the illicit benefit to the in-
sider, and it is this conduct which impairs the integrity of the market
and which is the target of the rule. If the insider does not trade, he
has an absolute right to keep material information secret [citing TGS
I]. Investors must be prepared to accept the risk of trading in an
open market without complete or always accurate information. De-
fendants’ trading did not alter plaintiffs’ expectations when they sold
their stock, and in no way influenced plaintiffs’ trading decision. . . .
We hold, therefore, the defendants’ act of trading with third persons
was not causally connected with any claimed loss by plaintiffs who
traded on the impersonal market and who were otherwise unaffected
by the wrongful acts of the insider.43
41. Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 238–39 (internal citations omitted).
42. Id. at 242.
43. Id. at 318–19.
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It acknowledged its disagreement with Shapiro, though in part by set-
ting up something of a strawman. The Shapiro court had rested a minor
part of its opinion on a reading of the sixth finger of the elements of
fraud; namely, the proof-of-damages ruling in the Supreme Court’s Affili-
ated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States opinion:44
In our view, the correct measure of damages . . . is the difference
between the fair value of all that the mixed-blood seller received and
the fair value of what he would have received had there been no
fraudulent conduct, . . . except for the situation where the defendant
received more than the seller’s actual loss. In the latter case damages
are the amount of the defendant’s profit.45
An influential revisit of this vexing problem arrived four years later
with Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., another tippee case, articulating the
reasons why, on balance, the Fridrich disgorgement approach was the
only appropriate one.46 With this largely doctrinal conflict between these
leading cases on the books, there matters rested until the beginning of the
next phase of this march towards SOX.
C. THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW AFTER TGS I AND II—PHASE TWO
In 1988, Congress enacted the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud En-
forcement Act (ITSFEA).47 As a first case analyzing the statute de-
scribed it:
[The act] undercut the principal assumption of Fridrich—that tradi-
tional common law principles of privity and causation are the basis of
securities fraud litigation. By enacting ITSFEA, Congress expanded
the scope of remedies available to plaintiffs alleging injury from in-
sider trading violations, and created statutory causes of actions as
alternatives to common law causation and privity.48
44. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). There, albeit in a face-to-face non-market context, the inten-
tional omission of material facts led plaintiffs to sell their securities to purchasers who
knew of and stood to gain substantial profits due to a TGS-like major shale oil strike.
45. Id. at 155 (citing the “increase in value” definition of disgorgement used in Janigan
v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965)).
46. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 172–73 (2d Cir. 1980).
47. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988), codified as § 20A of the Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a) (2012) (allowing the private action to be brought by “any person who,
contemporaneously with the purchase or sale of securities that is the subject of such viola-
tion, has purchased . . . or sold . . . securities of the same class.”).
Despite the liberalization implicit in the statute, the “contemporaneous trading” stand-
ing requirement over time has been read narrowly, on balance more narrowly than before.
See generally William K. S. Wang, The “Contemporaneous” Traders Who Can Sue an Inside
Trader, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1175 (1987) (describing the first half-decade of this judicial
development).
48. In re Nord Res. Corp. Sec. Litig., Nos. C-3-90-380, C-3-90-391, C-3-90-409, C-3-90-
410, 1992 WL 1258516, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 16, 1992):
ITSFEA . . . created statutory causes of actions as alternatives to common
law causation and privity. The fact that Congress also expressly included a
then uncertain theory of insider trading liability, misappropriation, in the am-
bit of Rule 10b–5 violations, further indicates its desire to expand remedies
for insider trading. Finally, legislative history cited approvingly decisions
from the Second Circuit, collectively in tension with Fridrich, and one of
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The basis for this reading is the clause allowing the private action to be
brought by “any person who, contemporaneously with the purchase or
sale of securities that is the subject of such violation, has purchased . . . or
sold . . . securities of the same class.”49
During this period, not coincidentally during the Carter Administra-
tion, another statute was enacted that foreshadowed SOX in the context
of expanding the scope of administrative action. The Securities Enforce-
ment Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, which despite the
latter part of its name applies to all reporting companies, gave the SEC
specific authorization to seek civil money penalties for violations of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934, as well as of the
Investment Company and Investors Advisers Acts of 1940.50 The princi-
pal debate voiced criticism of the possibility of punishing merely negli-
gent transgressions—focusing in particular on failures to issue the
periodic reports required of the smaller but publicly held companies.51 A
more indirect but, in the context of this article’s context, relevant criti-
cism concerned the measure of the civil penalty in cases of serious trans-
gressions, but (unlike insider trading) lacking a metric with which to
quantify the penalty, leading to a budgetary resource problem.52
which [Shapiro] expressly rejects its rationale. Reliance on Fridrich would be
inconsistent with the will of Congress as expressed in ITSFEA . . . Accord-
ingly, the ruling in Fridrich no longer defines the causation necessary to state
a claim for insider trading.
Id. (internal citations omitted). The statute’s bite, especially as to its liberal disgorgement
definitions, has continued well into the SOX era. See SEC v. Svoboda, 409 F. Supp. 2d 331,
344 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). For a detailed factual application, see SEC v. Nadel, No. CV 11-0215,
2016 WL 639063, at *11–18 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2016).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a). In United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 665 n.11 (1997),
the Court was invited to use the statute in support of its holding, but declined to do so on
the ground that the “misappropriation” doctrine it there espoused would suffice.
50. Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.). See generally Arthur Laby & W. Hardy Callcott, Patterns of SEC Enforcement
Under the 1990 Remedies Act: Civil Money Judgments, 58 ALBANY L. REV. 5 (1994) (re-
viewing the statute fully only a few years after its enactment).
51. See Laby & Callcott, supra note 50. The authors cite Chairman Breeden’s mollify-
ing comment that the SEC had only once (and then, only an egregious case) used its au-
thority to fine issuers who failed to file periodic reports under § 32 of the Securities
Exchange Act (the only prior example of an express civil penalty authorization, and at
that, only $100 per day of delay). Id. at 7 n.20. I can indirectly but personally confirm this.
In 1958, as a new associate in a Rochester, New York, firm, I fielded an urgent call from a
client’s CEO asking what to do as his CFO had forgotten to make such a filing. In the
absence of the relevant partner, I researched the issue, found the penalty provision, ob-
tained the caller’s approval to have the firm immediately cut a check for the five days’
delay, and then sent it by special delivery to the SEC. On his return, the partner agreed the
statute said what it did, but added that he had never heard of its use. He called an acquain-
tance in the relevant unit and learned that the SEC had never before received such a
payment, but had deposited it in the agency’s general account, as there was no ledger line
specifying otherwise. I have it on information and belief that it became the unit’s coffee
fund for the next several years, but that probably was an apocryphal tale concocted by the
partner.
52. See id. at 49. On the other hand, the scourge of the penny-stock phenomenon
seems to have been significantly reduced by SEC actions under the statute, at least in the
first few years following the enactment. See Examination Sweep of Penny Stock Firms
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D. MORE PROCEDURAL HURDLES: FROM RULE 23 CLASS ACTIONS
TO MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION CONSOLIDATION53
One more sidetrack between TGS and SOX needs brief comment. As
earlier indicated, a number of private class actions were instituted in the
wake of the SEC cases, one of which was already filed in 1966.54 Before
their transfer to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, one group
already had received class action certification, but on an unrealistically
narrow basis.55 Eligible were only those members who had sold their
shares in the four-day period between the issuance of the April 12 mis-
leading press release and its correction mid-morning of April 16 and had
mitigated their losses by essentially immediate repurchases. A small num-
ber who sold only one day later, not to mention the far larger number
who had sold earlier,56 were excluded from the class.
One case, however (Reynolds, which was indeed the earliest of the pri-
vate actions), had been filed in the Utah federal district. The plaintiff’s
effort to obtain class certification was denied, on the ground that all other
cases had been filed in the Southern District of New York and were well
on the way through pre-trial discovery.57 His individual action, however,
which meantime had been joined by three other parties, resulted in a
judgment in which the damages were based on a different time span.58
They had sold their shares only after April 12, but the normal generous
period of loss mitigation had been applied, with the result that the large
second burst of Texas Gulf Sulphur (TGS) shares’ price rise was cov-
ered.59 The four plaintiffs in Reynolds, after the mentioned removal, then
Finds Major Drop in Penny Stock Activity, SEC NEWS DIGEST, June 29, 1994, at *1, 1994
WL 285118.
53. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in
various sections of 28 U.S.C.).
54. See the docket list attached to In re Texas Gulf Sulphur Sec. Litig., 344 F. Supp.
1398, 1400 (J.P.M.L. 1972). One case (Reynolds) actually had already been filed in 1966, in
the Utah federal district, even before the lower court’s decision in the SEC’s case. See
generally Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F.Supp. 566 (D. Utah 1970), aff’d sub
nom, Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971) (looking specifically
at this chronology).
55. See Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 53 F.R.D. 220, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
56. Id. Recall that in the SEC action the court ruled that only insider purchases from
late fall onward fell under 10b-5’s proscription.
57. See Reynolds, 309 F.Supp. at 567–59. Their class action plea was removed under
§ 1404 to the Southern District of New York, where all other cases (both federal and re-
moved state actions) were pending.
58. See Mitchell, 446 F.2d at 105.
59. See id. The court’s reasoning is worth stating, as it was one of the first grappling
with these mitigation issues in a 10b-5 case in which the damages were not limited to the
trader’s profit disgorgement but were based on the company’s misleading information that
distorted the market:
By Monday, April 20, the diligent and reasonable investor was informed of
the most recent TGS statement [of April 16] and . . . after that duration a
reasonable stockholder would not have relied upon the April 12 statement in
selling his TGS stock. After the reasonable investor had opportunity to ap-
prise himself the April 16 release and its import to investment, a reasonable
time lapse may be allowed to expire to permit the investor to decide whether
or not he would reinvest and take advantage of a[n upward] spiraling market.
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applied in the class action pending in the Southern District of New York
for inclusion of a sub-class consisting of persons who had sold their TGS
shares later than April 16—albeit only one day later; in other words,
those who by the earlier date had not yet become aware of or digested
the implications of the corrective statement.60
In a somewhat cursory fashion, the court rejected this gambit, holding
that the great majority of shareholders who had sold their holdings on the
basis of the misleading April 12 release had done so by the end of day
April 16. Based on this assertion, the court found that the Reynolds class
failed the “numerosity” requirement.61 At about the same time, the same
court had rejected applications for class certification brought by those
shareholders who had sold their shares earlier;62 in other words, before
the clearly misleading April 12 press release but during the time when
TGS executives were purchasing shares of the company on the basis of
what the SEC cases had found were Rule 10b-5 violations.63 Two grounds
were given for that rejection, the first of which anticipated developments
decades later—this class, too, would be too numerous to manage.64 The
other rested on a doctrinal problem: Since these sales occurred during the
period of material non-disclosure by the insider-traders, the causal rela-
tions between that non-event and plaintiffs’ sales required individual
proof and could not fit under “common questions of fact prerequisite.”65
Four months later, the court approved settlement of both the federal
class actions and the few state derivative suits over the objections of those
who pointed to the better deal Reynolds and his two co-plaintiffs had
received in the Utah litigation.66
As for the impact of the only recently authorized Judicial Panel for
Multidistrict Litigation (JPML), important as it has become in later situa-
tions, it had only one trivial stage appearance in the TGS play. Before the
settlement, the JPML had appointed Judge Bonsal, who was in charge of
the Southern District actions, as the transferee judge under the relatively
new § 1407, the multi-district litigation removal statute. Although the
lead Utah plaintiff, earlier removed to the Southern District under
§ 1404, accepted the settlement, one—Fox—had continued his individual
Utah action.67 The defendants applied to the Multidistrict Litigation
(MDL) panel to order his case’s removal to the transferee court, and in
Id. The court considered both a nine- and a seventeen-day reflection period but did not
have to choose because the “second-burst” market value peaked within the first period.
See id.
60. See Cannon, 53 F.R.D. at 218.
61. Id. at 219.
62. Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 55 F.R.D. 306, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
63. That is, under the “magnitude discounted by probability of occurrence” formula.
64. Cannon, 55 F.R.D. at 307.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 317. One other objector foreshadowed the arguments erupting after Basic,
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249–50 (1988); namely, that the costs of the settlement
would harm the innocent shareholders of the company. See Cannon, 55 F.R.D. at 312.
67. See In re Texas Gulf Sulphur Sec. Litig., 344 F. Supp. 1398, 1399 (J.P.M.L. 1972).
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one of the first decisions elaborating on the criteria for removal pursuant
to § 1407, the JPML agreed and ordered the removal.68
E. CONGRESS CLAMPS DOWN ON THE PRIVATE ACTION—
PHASE THREE
This phase does not need extended discussion. The first scene of this
act is the arrival of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.69
Its pleading standard, and its mandatory stay of pre-trial discovery pend-
ing complete disposition of all defense motions, are and remain its central
features (the former led to President Clinton’s—overridden—veto).70
Further restrictions with consequences for the appetite of plaintiff’s bar
to engage in this form of litigation include the reconfirmed disapproval of
“aider-and-abettor” liability, the related switch from joint and several to
proportional liability of secondary defendants (especially accounting
firms with deeper insurance-policy pockets), and the lead-plaintiff provi-
sions reducing the ability of the plaintiff’s bar to control the strategies
and tactics of the litigation.71
The second scene is the move, only three years later, to forestall plain-
tiffs’ immediate effort to avoid this stringent statute by filing state-law
versions of the securities acts in the state courts, especially in California
with its own mini-Rule 10b-5. The Securities Litigation Uniform Stan-
dards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) provides that “[n]o covered class action”
based on state law and alleging “a misrepresentation or omission of a
material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered secur-
ity” may be “maintained in any State or Federal court by any private
party.”72 Home-state class actions, derivative suits, though a species of
class actions, were exempted from this bar (the “Delaware exceptions,”
as they came to be called), and suits with less than fifty members were not
preempted. But in all other respects, the statute was read broadly, espe-
cially in its reach of analogous state actions that could not have been
brought in federal courts because of standing deficiencies.73 In a candid
opinion by Justice Stevens, laying out and deferring to congressional find-
ings of abusive and frivolous cases (much in the spirit of the reasoning in
the “prudential” Blue Chip case), closed that loophole and, with that clo-
sure, limited private class actions to the extremely narrow aperture left
68. Id. at 1400.
69. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012)).
70. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A), (b)(3)(B).
71. § 74u-3(a)(3), (b), (f). The effort of the plaintiff’s bar to end-run these barriers by
bringing actions under Rule 10b-5(c)—”scheme and artifice to defraud”—was blocked by
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci. Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159–60 (2008). For a good
illustration of the pros and cons of the new “lead plaintiff” approach, see In re Cal. Micro
Devices Sec. Litig., 965 F. Supp. 1327 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
72. § 78bb(f)(1)(A).
73. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 84–89 (2006)
(a state version of a Rule 10b-5 violation that would have failed in federal dress under Blue
Chip’s rule that plaintiffs had to be purchasers or sellers was involved).
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open by the 1995 statute.74
Nevertheless, nothing is ever fully clear. The statutory exemptions pro-
duced a slew of issues requiring judicial construction. These cases have
led to a number of partly conflicting decisions. The two principal statu-
tory exemptions—the state-of-incorporation exemption,75 and the deriva-
tive-suit exemption76—are not particularly problematic. Others, involving
issues not resolved by the statute, are another matter. Some are deep in
the procedural weeds and are avoided here;77 one, however, dealing with
the common problem of mixed complaints, including both preempted and
non-preempted charges, has led to conflicting decisions on their partial or
total removal, and need at least to be referenced.78
Given all these difficulties and uncertainties, it remains the case that
the private class action of the insider-trading/misleading corporate infor-
mation type had fallen on hard times by 2002 and no longer seemed to be
what to some was a robust check on the political and budget-constrained
vagaries of regulatory control of these violations—to others, was an
abuse of the class-action concept.79 The ball thus was back in the arena of
74. See id. at 89.
75. § 77p(d)(1)(a) provides that “a covered class action . . . based upon the statutory
or common law of the State in which the issuer is incorporated (in the case of a corpora-
tion) or organized (in the case of any other entity) may be maintained in a State or Federal
court by a private party.”
76. § 77p(f)(2)(B) provides that “the term ‘covered class action’ does not include an
exclusively derivative action brought by one or more shareholders on behalf of a
corporation.”
77. The back-and-forth problems of removal and remand, in the context of non-ap-
pealability of interlocutory orders, are particularly complex and I do not delve into them
here. See generally Kircher v. Putnam Funds Tr., 547 U.S. 633 (2006); Proctor v. Vishay
Intertechnology, Inc., 584 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2009). The impact of the Class Action Fair-
ness Act (CAFA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in various sections of 28
U.S.C.) also need not be pursued as it does not bear on Rule 10b-5 class actions, which
arise not under the federal question subject matter jurisdiction, but on class actions based
on diversity jurisdiction. Most TGS class actions were under the former; the few brought
under state law in state courts (which cannot entertain Rule 10b-5 suits because of § 78aa’s
grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts) had been removed. Thus, the pool of
cases which might have been subject to CAFA already had dried up.
78. The problem stems in large part from the Supreme Court’s ruling on how to con-
strue pleadings of this sort. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547
U.S. 71, 84–89 (2006) (extending the SLUSA removal requirement to cases brought under
state-law versions of § 10b that, unlike their federal counterpart, permitted suits by non-
trading plaintiffs (i.e., those who relied on misleading information to hold on to their secur-
ities)). Now, however, using a definition of “non-covered securities” (those not subject to
removal) should allow a significant proportion of these cases to remain in state courts. See
Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 571 U.S. 377, 390 (2014).
79. There is a vast secondary literature on this development in the specific field of
securities regulation. See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS
RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS (Harv. Univ. Press ed. 2015). A vivid indicator of the
near-demise of the insider-trading and corporate-misstatement class actions lies hidden in
the statistics of the MDL website. See UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION, MDL STATISTICS REPORT—DOCKET TYPE SUMMARY (Mar. 15, 2018). Of
eight securities matters, only two such cases are there identified, and one of them is a
derivative suit. Further, consider the sparse record of the past five years from the already-
low starting point of 2012. See UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITI-
GATION, CALENDAR YEAR STATISTICS (2012); UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MUL-
TIDISTRICT LITIGATION, CALENDAR YEAR STATISTICS (2013); UNITED STATES JUDICIAL
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regulatory actions, specifically those brought by the SEC. And in 2002,
seven years after enactment of the PSLRA, and four years after SLUSA,
Congress accepted that consequence when it enacted the Sarbanes–Oxley
Act.
IV. WHERE ARE WE NOW?
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. was decided six
years after the enactment of SOX,80 and it is tempting to speculate that
its unanimous holding denying any possibility of aider-and-abettor liabil-
ity under Rule 10b-5 was an indirect recognition that the statute would
substantially fill the field now vacated through the practical, if not formal,
expulsion of the private class action by that time. While the core holding
extending the earlier jurisprudence to the Stoneridge facts rests on other
doctrinal grounds, one justification of the holding indeed does rest on the
new Fair Funds regime.
Given that conclusion, how has § 308 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act81
changed the landscape in the field of insider trading and misleading cor-
porate statements traditionally challengeable pursuant to Rule 10b-5?82
Nothing remains static, and the first recognition of that truism lies in
the revival of the private class action to a place alongside, if not ahead of,
SEC proceedings of the TGS type. At first, it seemed otherwise. In 2014,
in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.,83 the Supreme Court sig-
nificantly cut back the fraud-on-the-market dogma and held that class
certification was not to be considered before a ruling on whether plain-
tiffs’ reliance on the rebuttable presumption of an efficient capital mar-
ket—Basic’s basic point84—was justified.85 Defendants were thus entitled
to at least attempt to prove the lack of a price impact as a bar to class
PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, CALENDAR YEAR STATISTICS (2014); UNITED
STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, CALENDAR YEAR STATISTICS
(2015); UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, CALENDAR
YEAR STATISTICS (2016); UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGA-
TION, CALENDAR YEAR STATISTICS (2017).
80. Stoneridge Invest. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 165
(2008). Indeed, Merrill Lynch also fuels that suspicion. See Merrill Lynch, 547 U.S. at
84–89.
81. See 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2012).
82. This provision, in the words of the SEC Report responding to it, required the SEC
to “review and analyze enforcement actions by the Commission over the five years preced-
ing the enactment of this Act that have included proceedings to obtain civil penalties or
disgorgements to identify areas where such proceedings may be utilized to efficiently, ef-
fectively, and fairly provide restitution for injured investors. . . .” SECURITIES EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 308(C) OF THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF
2002.
83. 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
84. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249 (1988). The same challenge, however,
was not allowed to target the “materiality” element of a fraud claim. See Halliburton, 134
S. Ct. at 2410. The Court had confirmed the holding on this point in a case decided just a
year earlier. See generally Amgen v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455 (2013).
85. See Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2416–17.
672 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
certification, since that demonstration could remove the common-basis-
of-fact component of a certification.
The statistics on class action filings seemed to bear out that prediction.
The year after the enactment of SOX, class action filings dropped below
two hundred per year, and the 1997–2016 average also was below that
number.86 Since 2014, however, despite Halliburton, there has been a
strong resurgence, from two hundred seventy-one filings in 2016 to four
hundred twelve in 2017, with the first quarter of 2018 maintaining that
level.87 This figure, however, is misleading in the context of this narrative,
as it includes all filings under § 11 and § 12(2) of the 1933 Securities Act,
as well as filings relating to mergers and acquisitions. Dropping the last
category reduces the filings to one hundred ninety-four, which as a pro-
portion of all securities-regulation-related filings is significantly lower
than in previous years.88 And of more significance: All of the most recent
set concerned corporate financial misrepresentations, and only twelve
cases involved claims of insider trading.89 In short, while class actions for
alleged corporate misconduct have remained numerically significant, the
insider-trading class action has all but disappeared.
These statistics highlight the arguable significance of regulatory filings
by the SEC and Department of Justice (DOJ). Since this presentation
concerns the contemporary role of conservatorship proceedings, a brief
look at the use of § 308 is necessary.90
As amended in 2010 by the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act, the SEC is now allowed to distribute both penal-
ties and disgorgements, not only to harmed investors but also to a newly-
created Investor Protection Fund used to reward whistleblowers, as well
as to the Treasury.91 As a result, of the approximately 3,600 enforcement
86. Securities Class Action Filings—2017 Year in Review, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH 1,
39 (2018), https://www.cornerstone.com/publications/reports/securities-class-action-filings-
2017-yir.
87. See id. For 2018 statistics, see STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-cases.html (identifying eighty-eight
filings through March 12, 2018) (last visited Mar. 12, 2018).
88. Taking just the 2016 and 2017 filings into account, Rule 10b-5 filings represented
67% of all 271 filings in 2016, as against 47% of the 412 filings in 2017, resulting in a
smaller absolute number than in the previous year. Securities Class Action Filings, supra
note 86, at 39. And the 2016 numbers themselves show a sharp proportional decline from
the 85% level of the prior three years. See id.
89. Id. The drop in the proportion of (specifically) Rule 10b-5 filings alleging insider
trading is even sharper when measured over the prior four years: from 18% in 2013, 16%
in 2014 and 2015, to 10% in 2016, and to the mentioned 3% in 2017. Id.
90. Mention at least should be made of a partial predecessor, the Securities Enforce-
ment Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, supra note 5050, which authorized
by the SEC to order disgorgement as a remedy in its administrative proceedings, and in-
cluded further authorization for distribution to harmed investors.
91. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1641 (2010) (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a)). It
also eliminated the requirement that disgorgement, as well as penalties, had to be ordered
in order to allow the latter to be included in distributions to harmed investors. See OFFICE
OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 1010, at 3.
While this article essentially is limited to describing the journey from TGS to the present
day, two important critiques of this development should at least be referenced, even if only
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actions brought between fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2014, of which
only half included any monetary relief, only three hundred fifty were con-
sidered for distribution, and only two hundred of these (both figures ap-
proximate) resulted in a distribution.92 As for the actual amounts
collected (as compared with the amounts ordered to be paid), the same
2015 Inspector General Report indicates modest (if non-trivial) flows: ap-
proximately $1.75 billion ($2.75 billion) in FY 2010, the year of the Dodd-
Frank Act’s enactment; $1.5 billion ($2.75 billion) for FY 2011; $1.1 bil-
lion ($3.1 billion) for FY 2012; $1.9 billion ($3.4 billion) for FY 2013; and
$2.4 billion ($4.2 billion) for FY 2014.93 As of July 2015, a total of approx-
imately $6.75 billion was in the process of distribution in seventy-seven
cases (presumably, though this is not stated, to “harmed investors”
only).94 This suggests a fairly active distribution process, though a num-
ber of the annual § 308 announcements disclose several years of ongoing
distribution activity.95
Further, these annual § 308 announcements reveal a new, and perhaps
unexpected, scenario: essentially all SEC actions involving the creation of
a fair-fund distribution plan concern the financial sector. Specifically,
SEC actions have been brought against investment banks, broker-dealers,
and private equity funds. Apparently, the SEC does not use this proce-
dure where other sectors of the economy are concerned. But, that does
not end the story, as the disgorgement-of-profits remedy continues to be
used, though today almost exclusively in the tipper-tippee context.96
These cases, however, do not show up in the § 308 statistics, despite the
common remedy of disgorgement.
Further, given the Supreme Court’s recent formulation, albeit in the
criminal law setting, of an expansive definition of the tipper-tippee rela-
briefly. See generally Sonia Steinway, Comment, SEC “Monetary Penalties Speak Very
Loudly,” but What Do They Say? A Critical Analysis of the SEC”s New Enforcement Ap-
proach, 124 YALE L.J. 209 (2014) (showing with supporting data that most civil penalty if
not disgorgement collections go to the U.S. Treasury rather than to harmed investors).
More fundamentally, see Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for De-
frauded Investors? 63 BUS. LAW. 317 (2008) (arguing that this newly enhanced function
directly contributes to the political arguments against private, especially class action-based
enforcement). I have mentioned the influence of SOX in this connection earlier; see supra
note 81 and accompanying text.
92. See id. at 2.
93. Id. at 6 tbl.3.
94. Id.
95. See also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DISTRIBUTIONS IN COMMISSION ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCEEDINGS: NOTICES AND ORDERS PERTAINING TO DISGORGEMENT AND
FAIR FUNDS, https://www.sec.gov/litigation/fairfundlist.htm (listing cases filed pursuant to
§ 308).
96. A cursory overview of cases decided since the recent and leading case of SEC v.
Orbus, 693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012), identifies over a dozen reported cases brought by the
SEC, almost all of them tipper-tippee situations. Two deserve notice for their doctrinal
significance: SEC v. Kinnucan, 9 F. Supp. 3d 370, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) with its careful
distinction between a tipper’s liability for direct-tippee profits, and SEC v. Sabrdaran, 252
F. Supp. 3d 866, 905–06 (N.D. Cal. 2017) with its more complex approach to the tipper’s
liability for the more remote downstream tippees’ profits.
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tionship in the area of family rather than business relationships,97 one
may see increased SEC activity in the wider civil litigation context as
well.98 In short, it may be that the distinction turns on the willingness of
the financial sector to settle the relatively technical 1933 Act charges, as
against the approach of both individual “trading” actors and corporate
“misstatement” actors, to test the viability of defenses against charges
that, in doctrinal terms, may be pushing for expansion of those
doctrines.99
But these are—for now—idle speculations that should await the oppor-
tunity to celebrate the next birthday of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur.
97. See generally Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016) and United States v.
Martoma, 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2017).
98. The journalistic stories concerning the political will of the SEC to act aggressively
against these two classic § 10b violations is not something that can be rigorously evaluated
within the constraints of this contribution.
99. As indeed was the case in Sabrdaran as well as—in the DOJ and not SEC con-
text—in Salman. See Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 426; Sabrdaran, 252 F. Supp. 3d at 881.
